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The arsenal ship program is unique and requires examining the possible features of
a paradigm shift in ship design. This thesis presents a user-friendly model with which a
decision maker can perform tradeoff analyses between adding specific systems and
technologies to the arsenal ship or adding the escort services of combatant ships. The
goal of the model is to produce configuration alternatives with high arsenal ship
survivability subject to a budget constraint. The model also examines operational logistics
by predicting the sustainability of forces with specified arsenal ship configurations. As
some inputs are necessarily speculative at this stage, the model is formatted parametrically
to facilitate easy updating. A balanced arsenal ship design incorporating point defense,
stealth, and hardening is the most attractive choice for littoral operations when life cycle
costs are considered. The naval component must also be balanced, reinforcing the notion




This thesis contains a computer model which incorporates spread sheets, macros,
Turbo Pascal source code, and executable files. While the authors have made every
possible attempt to validate input data and exercise the model for all conditions, the
computer model has not been validated by an independent source. The user is cautioned
that some data included is perishible as costs will change. Additionally, the data
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The development of an arsenal ship reaffirms the Navy's resolve to meet changing
post-Cold War threats. Forward
. . . From the Sea outlines the Navy's response for the
current world order. Emphasis is on projecting power from littoral regions with naval
expeditionary forces to support joint operations. In the littoral, the ship has little time to
defend against advanced cruise missiles fired from land.
In designing the ship, a determination must be made on what configuration (of
passive systems, active systems, and protection provided by other warships) will give the
most survivability for a given price. The unique mission of the arsenal ship and the new
contracting procedures of the arsenal ship program require that we examine the possibility
of a paradigm shift in ship design. The ship will carry minimal active self-defense systems,
so studies involving the incorporation of stealth and hardening design features (such as
selective armoring) are warranted.
The Arsenal Ship Tradeoff Analysis Model consists of a spreadsheet interface for
data input, result output, and Pascal program execution. Since by definition the design
alternatives are speculative at this stage, the model is formatted parametrically to facilitate
easy updating. Because the procurement, operating, and support costs of an arsenal ship
are as yet unknown, we consider the incremental life cycle costs of adding systems over
the base ship in our study. A baseline ship is an arsenal ship without any defensive
systems. We believe that we can more accurately estimate these incremental costs than
the cost of a conceptually new baseline ship.
The Arsenal Ship Tradeoff Analysis Survivability Sub-model is designed to track
configurations, costs, and survivability. Our objective is to present a user-friendly model
with which a decision maker can perform tradeoff analyses between adding specific
systems and technologies to the arsenal ship and adding the protective services of other
warships. The Survivability sub-model produces configuration alternatives with high
arsenal ship survivability subject to a budget constraint. The model allows us to gain
xm
insight into and draw conclusions about the value of hardening and stealth features for
naval ship designs in general.
For a wide range of circumstances and measures of effectiveness, the analysis
shows that building survivability into the arsenal ship is almost always preferred to
assigning escorts, even when only a small fraction (18.6%) ofthe surface combatant's life
cycle cost is charged against the escort role. Our recommendation for arsenal ship
survivability features is to incorporate stealth, point self-defense systems, and hardening
into the design.
Stealth characteristics and hard kill systems are, by the analysis, the features
appearing in preferred designs most often. Sensitivity analysis strongly supports a
moderate investment in stealth.
Even though hard kill systems were more commonly seen in the analytically
preferred results than soft kill systems, we believe soft kill systems are essential for littoral
operations. First, soft kill is synergistic with stealth, and the effectiveness of soft kill is
amplified. Second, soft kill measures have been highly effective in actual combat, but hard
kill systems remain largely unproven Operating in littoral waters with current rules of
engagement (weapons not free) makes the arsenal ship vulnerable to initial and sudden
attacks without ample time to respond with hard kill.
Our model shows that when surprise attacks occur, hardening is a very attractive
feature of ship design. The additional staying power to remain mission capable after at
least one hit will help ensure that the arsenal ship's 500-plus missiles are not rendered
useless by a lucky or cheap shot.
We have gone to some pains to show that stealth, ship hardening, and defensive
short range, hard and soft kill systems are complementary. For example, stealth adds
nothing when the arsenal ship is firing a large missile volley, radiating, subject to air attack
with bombs, surface gunfire attack, or a submarine launched torpedo attack. But,
hardening retains its effectiveness in all these circumstances.
Our overall conclusion is that stealth, ship hardening, and some set of modern
point defense (hard and soft) are, in view of their modest cost in construction and
xiv
operating personnel, well worth the modest cost on the margin because the arsenal ship's
concept of operation requires that it be exposed to major attack.
Operational logistics is examined by exploring the sustainability of different
naval component forces in the Sustainability Sub-Model. The arsenal ship program would
make little sense if the ship could not improve the naval component's time on station. A
highly survivable ship contributes to a force's sustainability. Sustainability is not only
measured in days on station, but also in terms of incoming missiles that can be countered,
since the solution is scenario-dependent. This key aspect of logistical robustness has not
received the attention it deserves.
The arsenal ship alleviates the requirement to frequently cycle surface combatants
with fewer VLS cells from the scene of action off station to a replenishment site and back
again into the action. By its presence, the arsenal ship will sustain other surface
combatants on station. It can remain on station longer than any othef ship for a given
missile delivery rate, but when its weapons are expended the reload problem will take it
off station for a considerable amount of time.
A balanced design will seek to maximize the arsenal ship's net delivered
firepower over the combat life of the ship. Incorporating allfeatures listed is, according
to the analysis, tantamount to over-designing arsenal ship survival features, when its
survival with thosefeatures is compared to the survival of the accompanying present-day
surface combatants. Since the DDG-5 1 and CG-47 cost roughly the same to procure as
an arsenal ship-plus-missile load-out, and they will be less survivable, this may appear out
of balance. However, in the future as more Arleigh Burke destroyers and SC-21 type






On May 23, 1996, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
released the Arsenal Ship Program Solicitation. The arsenal ship will be designed
commercially and benefit from streamlined contracting procedures with early contractor
involvement. The program is managed by the Arsenal Ship Joint Program Office, under
the cognizance ofDARPA. and will follow a five stage process. In July, five industry
teams were awarded Phase One contracts to develop preliminary designs. Phase One will
last for six months, after which the top two teams will be awarded Phase Two (one year)
contracts to develop more detailed, functional designs. In Phase Three, one team will be
selected to construct a prototype or demonstrator. Phases Four and Five constitute
operational evaluation and production [Refs. 1 and 2].
1. Requirements
The Naval Postgraduate School's Total Ship System Engineering (TSSE) team has
been tasked to develop an arsenal ship design which might assist in exploring options
being considered by industry teams. Before designing the ship, a determination must be
made on what configuration (of passive systems, active systems, and protection from
escort ships) will give the most survivability for a given price. Maximizing survivability of
the arsenal ship subject to cost constraints will produce the numbers and types of system
subcomponents necessary to meet a required level of survivability. This thesis focuses on
the survivability of the arsenal ship and will provide a tool for the TSSE team. Validating
the draft capabilities defined for the arsenal ship is not an objective.
The authors' recent participation in the Future Navy Game II provided insight for
the model as well as another avenue for employing the model. We were invited to
participate because of our familiarity with the arsenal ship program, and the game
considered force calculi with differing numbers of arsenal ships. The seminar war game is
part of a series of games sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Director of
Net Assessment with the goal of examining the "operational and organizational
1
implications of a Navy precision-maneuver strategy against a large peer competitor in the
2020 timeframe." Results from the game series will be used in the Navy Long Range
Planning Process and the PR99 assessment cycle. [Ref. 3] The participants are given a
limited budget to buy advanced systems, and then play a scenario with their chosen
systems. The game is evolving and becoming more analytical; recently small Excel
spreadsheet models have been incorporated to aid in estimating mine warfare capabilities
and strategic airlift scheduling. Operational logistics and the effects of attrition on naval
forces are largely neglected. The sustainability portion of our model could prove useful
for this and other future war games.
2. Threats and Employment Concept
The development of an arsenal ship reaffirms the Navy's resolve to meet changing
post-Cold War threats. Forward . . . From the Sea outlines the Navy's response for the
current world order. Emphasis is on projecting power from littoral regions with naval
expeditionary forces to support joint operations. Surface ships with theater ballistic
missile defense capabilities presumably foster conventional deterrence by discouraging the
proliferation of ballistic missiles by our allies and adversaries. Such forces provide theater
Commanders-in-Chief with rapid response, measures to control escalation, and a transition
force able to act before land-based troops arrive in theater in the event of a major regional
contingency. [Ref. 4]
According to the Capabilities Document, the arsenal ship will have two main
missions: its primary mission is long-range strike and invasion stopping, and its secondary
mission consists of tactical strike, fire support, battlefield interdiction, and battlespace
dominance support (theater air defense, anti-air warfare, tactical ballistic missile defense)
[Ref. 1]. A total force of five or six forward-deployed arsenal ships is envisioned. Arsenal
ships will bolster the essential surge response capabilities and provide the theater
Commander-in-Chief with a new operational maneuver element. These ships will carry an
array of vertically launched weapons into littoral regions to support a land campaign.
They will operate under the control and protection of multi-mission combatants, including
Aegis cruisers and destroyers. Table 1 delineates representative target sets the arsenal ship
might engage, and Table 2 lists weapons the ship should be able to carry to counter each
threat.
Halt Invasion Long Range Strike Battlespace
Dominance
Surface Fire Support
Complex Air Land Maneuve National/Regional C4I Manned A/C Long-Range Artillery
Adaptive Battle Groups (e.g.. Space Control TBMs, UAVs TBMs
Armed OMGs) Cruise Missiles Logistics Assets
Forces SAM/AAA
Armored, Armor-Heavy National and Regional C4I Manned A/C Long-Range Artillery




Infantry Armor/Mech. Military Region District Manned A/C Medium-Range
Based Armed Pure" units C4I SAM/AAA Artillery
Forces (BDEs/BNs) Logistics Assets
Internal Transportation National CMD Authority OP Bases Light Logistics Assets
Security Railroads Military Concentrations A/C Coastal Patrol Economic Asset Local
Light Force Trucking, Light
Vehicles
Craft Forces
Table 1. Target sets to be countered by arsenal ship from Ref. [A].




Complex SM-2/ATACMS-BAT TLAM ATACMS ATACMS, SLAM
Adaptive SLAM TLAM-C/D TLAM-C/D
Armed TLAM-BAT Naval Gunfire
Forces TLAM-C (VGAS/SCRAM)
Armored SM-2/ATACMS-BAT SM-2/ ATACMS-BAT ATACMS ATACMS, SLAM
Mechu Armed TLAM-BAT, SLAM TLAM-BAT SLAM TLAM-C/D TLAM-C/D Naval
Forces Strike-SM Strike-SM Gunfire
(VGAS/SCRAM)
Infantry ATACMS TLAM-D ATACMS ATACMS, SLAM
Based Armed SLAM ATACMS-ER TLAM-C/D Naval
Forces Strike-SM Gunfire
(VGAS/SCRAM)
Internal Naval Gunfire TLAM-C ATACMS ATACMS
Security (VGAS/SCRAM) Naval Gunfire Naval Gunfire
light Force (VGAS/SCRAM) (VGAS/SCRAM)
Table 2. Weapons to counter target sets from Ref. [1].
While the arsenal ship will add new capabilities, it will also face new threats. The
littoral affords less space for operations, and the interface between sea and shore is where
chaos is most prevalent. Fighting in the littoral subjects the ship to attacks from shore
with more advanced missiles. These factors result in less time to react to an incoming
missile attack.
3. Design Philosophy
Conceptually, the arsenal ship is a force multiplier and should function as a cost-
effective, remote missile magazine. The target unit price is $450 million or less with a
ceiling of $550 million in FY 98 dollars The design life is thirty five years. The ship may
be unmanned or manned with 50 or fewer people. Projections for the arsenal ship include
approximately 500 vertical launch cells; targeting will be accomplished by other ships with
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) or similar links and an over-the-horizon
(OTH) satellite link. The ship must carry sufficient fuel, consumables, and repair parts to
support a ninety-day mission. It must also be capable ofunderway refueling and
accommodating SH-60, V-22, and CH-46 aircraft with landing area and limited services
[Ref. 1],
Regarding arsenal ship survivability, OPNAV N8 states:
Though (the) arsenal ship will operate in any threat
environment under the protective umbrella of battle force
combatants, it must be survivable against 21st century anti-
ship missiles, torpedoes, and mines. An affordable balance
of active and passive on-board self defense features is
necessary. Active self defense should be roughly equivalent
to that of a combat logistics force ship. Passive defense
should capitalize on the benefits of mass (tonnage) and
innovative applications of multiple hull integrity and
signature reduction [Ref. 1].
B. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Numerous studies have assessed the staying power of ships or proposed means to
extend surface ships' ability to take hits and continue fighting. Incorporating stealth
technology reduces susceptibility. Many sources, including the Joint Munitions
Effectiveness Manuals cite the effectiveness of combat systems on susceptibility or
survivability. A thesis by John Schulte [Ref. 5] reminds us that ships can be hit by ASCMs
even with layered defenses. Further, empirical evidence and predictive equations
presented by Schulte and Humphrey [Ref. 6] show that current ships (with the exception
of aircraft carriers) are not built to the Timex standard. They cannot "take a licking and
keep on ticking." The Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Carderock Division
analyzed the effectiveness of anti-vulnerability features in ship design and reports that the
judicious application of hardening can greatly improve a ship's survivability without
becoming cost prohibitive or losing much maneuverability. [Ref. 7]. In the Military Worth
of Staying Power, Hughes states that through staying power, the military worth of a vessel
is sustained and can be measured by the "maximum accurately delivered ordnance over the
combat life of a warship" [Ref. 8].
A great deal of valuable work has been accomplished to date. Yet, no study
consolidates the above issues in a cost effectiveness study of an arsenal ship's survivability
and the task force's sustainabability.
C. MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
The intent of the arsenal ship program is to provide a relatively low-cost platform
to operate in the littoral regions. The unique mission of the arsenal ship and the new
contracting procedures of the arsenal ship program require that we examine the possibility
of a paradigm shift in ship design. The ship will carry minimal active self-defense systems,
so studies involving the incorporation of stealth and hardening design features (such as
selective armoring) are warranted. While not written specifically about the arsenal ship,
the excerpt below from an article in the Naval Engineers Journal summarizes the problem
well.
There has been significant change in national policy
and naval strategy over the last decade. We are now
focused to provide forward presence in peacetime and make
a critical contribution to power projection during the
transition from crisis to conflict. Our recent experience
indicates that these operations require force structures
higher than we can sustain with our current investment
accounts. The prospect for additional funding is dim, so we
must become more efficient in the utilization of our
resources. One of the keys is to determine the proper
balance of stealth, EW and hard kill systems for our next
generation of surface combatant.
... By these means we can significantly improve
ship staying power and overall mission effectiveness. ... To
accomplish these benefits, the Navy will need to develop
new concepts for littoral operations and conduct tradeoffs
where stealth, EW, and hard kill are balanced and not
treated as mutually exclusive. The result will be force
multiplying with a higher probability of mission success and
survival. [Ref. 9]
Our objective is to develop a user-friendly model with which a decision maker can
perform tradeoff analyses between adding specific systems and technologies to the arsenal
ship and adding the protective services of other warships. The immediate goal of the
model is to produce configuration alternatives with high arsenal ship survivability subject
to a budget constraint. Since by definition the design alternatives are speculative at this
stage, the model is formatted parametrically to facilitate easy updating. The model will
also allow us to gain insight into and draw conclusions about the value of hardening and
stealth features for naval ship designs in general.
Operational logistics is examined by exploring the sustainability of different naval
component forces. The arsenal ship program would make little sense if the ship could not
improve the naval component's time on station. A highly survivable ship contributes to a
force's sustainability. Sustainability is not only measured in days on station, but also in
terms of incoming missiles that can be countered, since the solution is scenario-dependent.
This key aspect of logistical robustness has not received the attention it deserves.
Related to this issue is the projection in the Surface Combatant Force Level Study
that around the year 2010 "The requirements for in-theater surface combatants exceeded
the numbers needed to escort CVBGs and ARGs by a considerable portion" [Ref. 10].
The situation is true now more than ever. The surface fleet has down-sized while "Surface
combatants have evolved into major combatants in their own right, able to make
significant contributions to the joint campaign. . ." [Ref. 10].
Since VLS tubes are not currently replenished at sea, an arsenal ship task force
may prove invaluable in the opening days of a conflict. The new platform may alleviate
the need of removing warships from their tasks to rearm, which would require rotating
replacement ships into the theater. Comparisons will be made between forces with and
without an arsenal ship, and an arsenal ship missile load-out that maximizes the naval
component's sustainability for a major regional contingency (MRC) will be offered.
This thesis focuses on the threat to an arsenal ship from anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs), which are presumed the most serious and likely threat in the littoral arena.
Since 1970, cruise missiles have caused more damage to warships and shipping than all
other threats combined. Obviously ASCMs are not the only threat. Mines and torpedoes
are nemeses that must be dealt with. While a ship can be hardened to withstand damage
from contact torpedoes, under hull torpedo or mine explosions are threats not easily
designed against. Other weapons, including gunfire and bomb raids on the ship can be
approximated in the model by changing the input ASCM explosive weight. The
methodology of the model can be applied to mine and torpedo threats, but even if effective
countermeasures could be traded-off, the authors believe that synergistic effects of vastly
different threats cannot be modeled responsibly or reliably. A pragmatic approach to
coping with the torpedo threat is to assume that ASW assets are required and deduct their
cost from the top of the available budget. The mine threat can be minimized by collecting
intelligence observations, avoiding areas known to be mined, and maintaining current
surveys of underwater characteristes for areas of interest (Q-route surveys).

II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
A. SURVIVABILITY EQUATION DEVELOPMENT
This section defines requisite terms, states assumptions, and derives our
survivability equation. The survivability equation is the base measure of effectiveness
applied in our iterative survivability model which can then be compared against cost.
Detailed derivations of individual probabilities appearing as multiplicative factors in said
equation appear later.
A naval ship's survivability is "the capacity of a surface ship to avoid and/or
withstand a man made hostile environment while performing its mission" [Ref 11]. Hence
survivability depends on susceptibility to attack and vulnerability once stricken.
Susceptibility is defined as the probability of being hit (Phit) and represents "the
inability of a ship to avoid the sensors, weapons, and weapons effects of that man-made
hostile environment" [Ref. 11]. The susceptibility of the arsenal ship is a function of
factors internal and external to the ship If escorted by surface combatants, the number
and types of ships in formation are important. Escorted or not, active and passive
defensive systems on the arsenal ship affect susceptibility. For example, the susceptibility
of an escorted arsenal ship under missile attack depends on the effectiveness of the
defending escort's weapons. If missiles leak through the escort's protective umbrella
(called leakers), the arsenal ship's point defense systems and degree of stealth factor into
its susceptibility.
Vulnerability is the conditional probability that a ship is killed given that it is hit
(PkiiiiHit) by a bomb, missile , torpedo, or mine [Ref. 11]. Values for (Pkmp-fit) depend on
physical characteristics of the ship and incoming weapon employed. Historically, studies
of ship vulnerability consider one or both oftwo degrees of vulnerability— the probability
that a ship is rendered not mission capable or the probability that a ship is sunk. This
thesis only considers mission kills. Hence, vulnerability is defined more narrowly as the
conditional probability that the arsenal ship is rendered not mission capable by an incoming
projectile.
The arsenal ship is unique in that it requires input from CEC capable ships or
satellites to accomplish its mission. Consequently, the arsenal ship can suffer a mission kill
if it remains intact but has no platform nearby to control its weapons. The effects of
escort attrition are considered significant, are estimated in the model, and will be
addressed later.
In the purest sense, vulnerability is assessed by the ratio of hits the ship sustains to
its staving power— the number of hits from a specified weapon required to affect a
mission kill (Na) Applying the results ofRichard Humphrey's Warship Damage Rules
for Naval Wargaming, staying power can be calculated as: NA = C(D/He) 1/2 ,where C is a
fitted constant based on an comprehensive study of ships damaged in World War II; D is
the displacement of the arsenal ship in tons, and He is the explosive weight of the
projectile in pounds [Ref. 6].
A more recent thesis by John Schulte derived an alternative formula for staying
power [Ref. 5]. As shown Table 3 below, both methods produce similar results.
Schulte' s thesis considered Exocet missile and equivalents, so, for comparison, we used
the Exocet' s explosive weight in Humphrey's equation. We incorporated the Humphrey
equation into our model because it considered larger ships. The Schulte thesis studied 222







FFG-7 5500 1.51 1.74
DDG-51 8300 1.86 1.97
DD-963 9100 1.95 2.02
CG-47 9600 2.00 2.06
Arsenal Ship 20000 2.89 2.52
Arsenal Ship 40000 4.08 3.02
Table 3. Comparison of staying power calculation results using an Exocet equivalent net
explosive weight.
The goal is to assess an arsenal ship's survivability. We define survivability (SA) as
the arithmetic complement of the probability of a mission kill (Pkiii) The probability of a
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mission kill is the product of the arsenal ship's susceptibility and vulnerability. Therefore,
arsenal ship survivability against a missile is: SA = l-(Phit)(Pidii|Hh) = (1-Pwii)
Expressed in terms of the number of notional missiles fired and the resulting
number of leakers, arsenal ship survivability can be calculated as: SA = 1-(MQ/Na), where
M is the number of well-aimed missiles; Q is the probability of leakers; and NA is the
staying power in hits. Hardness features can be incorporated into the ship design that will
increase the staying power by a factor of H. Assuming missile firings are independent,
identically distributed events with P(leaker) = Q, then leakers are distributed binomially
with parameters M and Q. Therefore, the expected number of leakers is: E [leakers] =
MQ and the expected damage to the arsenal ship is: £[damage] = MQ/(NAH).
Q can be decomposed into probabilities for individual events as shown in Table 4.
For a leaker to strike the arsenal ship the following must all occur.
EVENT ASSOCIATED PROBABILITY
Defending escort does not kill incoming missile Qae
Missile not affected by arsenal ship stealth Qas
Arsenal ship soft kill measures fail Qap
Arsenal ship point defense systems are ineffective Q*A
Note: Associatedprobabilities are derived below.
Table 4. Probabilities Contributing to a Leaker Damaging the Arsenal Ship
The resultant equation for survivability is: SA = l-(MQAEQASQApQAA /(NAH) )
B. KILL PROBABILITY DERIVATIONS
In this section the parameters for determining the survivability of the Arsenal ship
are given.
INDICES
i Soft kill systems
j Hard kill systems
t Escort types (ship classes)
UNIT QUANTITY
n Number of units of type t
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SOFT KILL SYSTEMS
These systems conduct soft kills on a shot. Systems like ESM and Chaff/Torch
divert a shot after the arsenal ship has been targeted by the ASCM.
HARD KILL SYSTEMS
Point defense systems physically kill leakers. The Mark 15 Vulcan Phalanx Close-
in-Weapon-System CIWS, rolling airframe missile (RAM), 5"54 gun, and Evolved Sea
Sparrow (ESS) are examples.
ESCORT TYPES
Cruisers (CG-47 Class - Ticonderoga), Destroyers (DDG-5 1 Class - Arleigh
Burke), (DD-963 Class - Spruance), Frigates (FFG-7 Class - Oliver Hazard Perry).
PROBABILITIES OF KILL
Pae Probability that escorts can kill an incoming shot.
Note : PAE is a representation of the aggregate probabilities. The value varies in
the simulation. Details of the iterative approach appear in Chapter III.
P, Probability that a system of type i can effect a soft kill of an incoming shot.
Pj Probability that a system of type j can kill an incoming shot.
Pm Probability that stealth precludes an incoming shot.
MISSILE LEAKER PROBABILITIES
Q^ Probability that the arsenal ship is not protected by the defending escort.
-[(i-^)
Q AS Probability that stealth does not preclude an incoming shot.
=[(!-<
Q^ Probability that the arsenal ship does not soft kill an incoming shot.
n(i-/>)
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Since the procurement, operating, and support costs of an arsenal ship are as yet
unknown, we consider the incremental cost of adding systems over the base ship in our
study. A base ship is an arsenal ship without any defensive systems. We believe that we
can more accurately estimate these incremental costs than the cost of a conceptually new
ship itself.
By conducting the tradeoff analysis using incremental costs, we also avoid some
difficult questions of arsenal ship O&S costs. These will depend on several unresolved
issues, the two most significant are:
1
.
The ship's manning level is unknown, and a rotation scheme such as blue-and-
gold crews may be used.
2. While desired capabilities have been published, how the ship will operate has
not been established.
While most calculations in the model do not require the base cost of the arsenal
ship, our estimates for the price of adding stealth and hardening do. In these instances, we
use the target cost of $450 million reported in the Arsenal Ship Program Solicitation. This
figure, which may be high, still affords $ 1 00 million for procuring defensive systems based




III. MODEL FLOW AND FUNCTION
The Arsenal Ship Tradeoff Analysis Model is designed to track configurations,
costs, survivability and sustainability. It is not intended to be a combat simulation. Only
those elements required to predict expectations of the desired output are incorporated in
the model.
The Arsenal Tradeoff Analysis Model overview in Figure 1 is actually comprised
of two smaller sub-models. The Survivability sub-model aids decision makers in
determining the best combination of arsenal ship self defense features
and escorts. The Sustainability sub-model tests a specifically designed arsenal ship























Figure 1 : Flow of the Arsenal Ship Trade-Off Analysis Program.
A. SURVIVABILITY SUB-MODEL
1. Input Section
The Survivability sub-model consists of a spreadsheet input section, two Pascal
programs, and a spreadsheet output display. In the input section, the user enters
parameters, scenario, and limiting factors for consideration in generating arsenal ship
configurations. After all inputs are made, the user is prompted to save the parameters to a
data file which is formatted for use by other programs in the model. Chapter IV will cover




This second step in the survivability model uses a Pascal program to enumerate all
possible combinations of arsenal ship self-defense features and escorts with the parameters
from the input section. It stores them in a file formatted for reading by the Survivability
program.
3. Survivability Program
The third step is to run the Survivability program — also coded in Pascal. The
model calculates the survivability and cost of an arsenal ship based on the defense features
and escort variables input by the user. In addition, the model determines the task force's
effectiveness in defending the arsenal ship and the number of SAMs remaining on the
arsenal ship. Each major component in Figure 2 will be discussed, highlighting the
assumptions and methodology. The enumeration file is opened, and the first system
combination is selected. Using the Excel data file, each combination of systems is run
through the survivability program outlined in the following pages. The output is a file
listing the systems which meet the limiting criteria.
a. Designate Defender
Ifthere are escorts, the most capable AAW platform will be chosen as the
task force defender (see Figure 3) If a defender has already been designated in a previous
run, it is re-confirmed as a mission capable defender. A mission capable defender is one
that has additional staying power and SAMs.
Our model assumes that the defender will always be positioned between the
threat and task force, hence, attack geometry is optimal. In reality, CEC and stationing
tactics promote coordinated fire between defenders. This reduces multiple ship
engagements, overkill and wasted ordnance. Hence our assumption that the best







Figure 2: Major components and flow of the Arsenal Ship Survivability Model
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Get next Defender
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Figure 3: Model flow of Designating Defender
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After each missile shot, the defender's cumulative damage is checked. If
the accumulated damage does not exceed its staying power and it has SM's left, then the
escort remains the defender for the next missile attack.
b. Missile Attack
Missile attacks are discrete independent occurances with the time between
events such that they do not saturate a defender's ability to engage incomings. The user
inputs the number of missiles to be engaged by defining a scenario that identifies the
number of missiles per wave per day.
c. Engage With Missiles
In this component the defender engages the incoming missiles with SAMs
(see Figure 4). If the defender has a sufficient number of missiles, it will engage the
inbound using a shoot-shoot-shift firing policy. This policy is chosen based on a littoral
scenario where the defender only has time for one engagement. This means every
incoming missile will be engaged with two SAMs and the defender will not shoot at the
same incoming missile even if it survives the initial salvo. An Aegis defender without
missiles will engage the incoming missile with arsenal ship missiles via the CEC link.
When the arsenal ship and Aegis defender are empty, a new defender is chosen. A non-
Aegis defender (not CEC capable) without missiles is considered not mission capable, and
a new defender is chosen.
After the inbounds are engaged, the number of leakers is determined. The
leaker formulation is given below. The next chance to defeat the leakers happens with the
task force's point defense systems.
Leakers = (1-PKSam)(1-PKSam)
a\ Determine Leaker Allocations
This component allocates leakers among the task force by radar cross
section (RCS) as shown below and in Figure 5. Simply stated, a unit's RCS percentage of
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Occurs
Figure 4: Engagement with Missiles by the defender
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Escort Allocation =









ArsenalRCS is the same as
originally input in the sheet























methods of determining radar cross section are available. They are represented in Figure 5
and described in the input section of Chapter IV.
e. Attrite Escorts
Referring to Figure 6, the model attrites on a fair share basis. The EA is
sub-allocated among the escorts, see formulation below. Each escort then engages its
share of leakers with their point defense systems. The damage incurred from leakers on all
available escorts is applied to the current defender. After a defender sustains damage,
EscortRCS
Escort' s Fair Share ofEA = (EA)2 EscortRCS,
its cumulative damage is compared to its staying power. Ifthe damage exceeds the
staying power, another defender is chosen (if there is another).
/ Attrite Arsenal Ship
Like the escorts, the AA is subjected to the arsenal ship's point defenses.
See Figure 7. The escorts have a single aggregate PK factor, whereas the arsenal ship's
PK depends on the system combination being considered. Arsenal ship damage is that
amount ofAA which defeats the hard kill, soft kill and anti-vulnerability features of the
ship. After the arsenal ship sustains damage its cumulative damage is compared to its




This model evaluates the long-run effects of an arsenal ship's survivability on the
battle force's sustainability. The input section consists of designating a specific arsenal
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Figure 6: Model component Attrite Escorts
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Damage for Arsenal ship based
on its Point Defense Capability
Damage = (AA)(Q Areenal )
where








Figure 7: Model component Attrite Arsenal Ship
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2. Enumeration Section
This program is identical to the Survivability model's enumeration program.
3. Sustainability Program
The major components of this program are similar to those in the Survivability
program (see Figure 2). The difference is that the arsenal ship's configuration is now
constant and the number of missiles the task force can withstand before the arsenal ship
reaches its limiting survivability is variable. Differences from the Survivability program
are outlined as follows.
a. Designate Defender
This component remains the same. See Figure 3.
b. Missile Attack
In this component, the number of missiles launched at the task force
becomes variable, unlike in the Survivability model where the features were the variables
and the maximum number of incoming missiles was fixed. The number of missiles a task
force can endure is representative of time on station. Missile attacks continue so long as
there is a ship in the task force not OOA.
c. Engage with Missiles
This component remains relatively the same as in Figure 4, except for code
which records the status of the defender when it becomes OOA.
a\ Leaker Determination
Same as in the Survivability model. See Figure 5.
e. Escort and Arsenal Attrition
Missile attacks and attrition occur so long as there are mission capable
ships in the task force. The survivability limiting criteria entered by the user apply to the
arsenal ship only. The escorts fight until they are OOA and the arsenal ship fights until it
reaches the limit of its staying power. The program runs until the task force is OOA. The




Flexibility and power are demonstrated in the input section. The user must input
susceptibility and vulnerability features of the escorts and arsenal ship. Each type of input
will be discussed and then followed with the values used to exercise the model to
investigate the relative values of survival attributes. Results will be presented in
Chapter V.
A. ESCORT SHIPS
The user may consider the defensive effectiveness of escorts currently or
potentially in the Fleet and their impact on the arsenal ship's survivability. Since this
model focuses on the ASCM threat, the escorts must have the ability to defend against
ASCMs. Ticonderoga Class (CG 47), Arliegh Burke Class (DDG 51), Kidd Class (DDG
993) and Oliver Hazard Perry Class (FFG 7) ships are used. SC-21 variants or other ships
can be used if the user has characteristic data. The following inputs are required of each
escort type.
1. Quantity
A minimum and maximum number of each candidate escort type is required. An
input of '0' for minimum and '2' for maximum means that the model will enumerate all
permutations with zero, one and two of this escort type. To fix or 'hardwire' the number
of an escort type, set the minimum and maximum numbers the same. For example,
changing the Ticonderoga minimum and maximum to ' 1 ' and ' 1 ' will force the model to
consider one CG-47 in each permutation. This thesis examines the quantity inputs shown
in Table 5 for our run of the model.
2. Single Salvo Kill Probability
AAW single salvo kill probability (PSSK) is the chance an escort will destroy an
incoming ASM with one SAM salvo. This probability accounts for incomings with direct
(the escort itself is the target) or crossing (another ship in the task force is the target)
flight paths. As explained in Chapter III, this model uses a shoot - shoot - shift SAM
firing doctrine by the escort designated as defender.
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Since an escort is more likely to kill an incoming vice a crossing target, we assume
an Aegis ship PSSK of .96 and .84 respectively. A mean of .91 is used for PSSK. This is
consistent with other unclassified studies which estimate an Aegis ship's single shot
effectiveness between the ranges of 0.7 and 0.8 [Ref. 8, p. 34]. Inputs for non-Aegis
ships are assumed to be lower, due to their lower detection and targeting capabilities.
Ship PSSKs are given in Table 5. Components in Table 5 that have not been discussed yet
will be detailed in what follows.
Ship Class MinQty MaxQty PSSK #SAMs PDPK Days Disp (tons) RCS
CG-47 2 0.91 70 0.503 90 9,600 49,896
DDG-51 2 0.91 50 0.503 90 8,300 24,998
DDG-993 1 0.75 56 0.394 90 9,800 51,515
FFG-7 2 CM* 21 0.394 90 3,700 33,069
Arsenal Ship mmm - - ',:.:: 284 20,000 36,750
Table 5: Model input values for the escorts
3. Number of Escort SAMs
SAM load out for each escort was calculated using the notional VLS load
out data from Ref. 10. On the average, 55.5% of the missiles per ship were allocated to
SAMs and 44.5% were allocated to strike. Table 5 shows the number of SAMs (# SAMs)
used throughout this thesis. This leaves 56, 40, 45, 37, 228 strike weapons for the CG-
47, DDG-51, DDG-993, FFG-7, and arsenal ship respectively.
4. Cost
The marginal cost of protecting an arsenal ship comes from defense features
contained within the arsenal ship and from escorts which provide protection services.
Both must be charged to the overall cost of the arsenal ship program. The model
considers costs on an annual lifecycle basis. The annual lifecycle cost is obtained by
dividing procurement cost by lifecycle length (in years) and adding the annual expected
O&S cost.
Ship procurement data was obtained from Data Search Associates' annual "U. S.
Weapon Systems Costs" publications [Ref. 12, Ref. 13]. Operational and Support costs
are published by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis' "Visibility and Management of
Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC)" Program Office [Ref. 16]. This thesis assumes
each escort has a lifecycle of 30 years. The procurement cost is determined by taking the
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total program cost (sum ofRDT&E, unit cost, and other costs) and dividing by the
number of ships procured. O&S cost is the total O&S costs (includes operational,
manpower, maintenance and indirect O&S costs) for all ships in the class divided by the
number of ships in the class. Table 6 gives a breakdown of costs for each escort in 1996















$1,237,038,179 $28,814,948 30 $70,049,554 $14,681,619
$1 ,063,900,596 $21 ,500,976 30 $56,964,329 $1 1 ,939,099
$469,262,553 $25,156,840 30 $40,798,925 $8,551 ,008
$298,513,074 $17,077,516 30 $27,027,952 $5,664,763
Table 6: Escort annual lifecyc e cost input in dollars per ye ar.
5. Displacement
Full-load displacements in tons, provided from Jane's Fighting Ships [Ref. 14] are
input (see Table 5). These values contribute to determining staying power as defined
earlier. A baseline estimate of the arsenal ship's displacement is required. The baseline is
a stripped-down, typically-designed, naval ship such as an amphibious ship. Accepted
arsenal ship displacement predictions are 20-40 thousand tons. We choose 20 thousand
tons to be conservative in our staying power calculations. The weight of hardening and
other features are not added, since their contribution to staying power is contained in their
PKs. This avoids a 'double dipping' effect.
6. Escort Time
How long (in days per year) will escorts be required to provide the survivability
level desired for the arsenal ship? The method of deployment and operational tempo will
significantly affect this value. For example, if the arsenal ship deploys continuously with a
carrier battle group (CVBG), the cost of escort services should contain the costs of all
escorts in the CVBG. Escort time would be shared between the arsenal ship and carrier
since both are receiving the same services. We assume there will be times when the
CVBG will split into smaller task groups— this is frequently the case today. The arsenal
ship, however, could deploy overseas like the maritime prepositioned force (MPF) ships.
In this case, a round number of 90 days per year could be used as the length of time the
arsenal ship will require protection; otherwise it would be pier side or training in non-
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hostile waters. Our methodology charges the escorts services solely to the arsenal ship. It
is evident that the fraction of the escort's life time (hence cost) that should be charged to
the arsenal ship task force is both a sensitive parameter and difficult to estimate. We
chose 90 days per year. Therefore, one-quarter of the escort's life cycle cost is used for
tradeoff analysis.
7. Mission Time
This is the percentage of escort time a ship actually conducts its AAW mission.
Beside providing escort services, an escort requires time to conduct maintenance, training
and replenishment which conflict with the AAW mission. The arsenal ship is only charged
for the time AAW services are provided, and not the full time the escort is attached to the
arsenal ship. We use 85%— the same as the CNO (N86) Surface Combatant Force
Level Study, Requirementsfor Joint Warfare which assumed a 15% "logistics factor" [Ref
10, p 4-9].
8. Self Defense
As discussed in Chapter III, a defender is designated from the task force to provide
first layer AAW defense with a SAM firing doctrine of shoot - shoot. Any leakers at that
point are assumed to be too close to engage with systems other than self defense soft kill
and hard kill point defense.
Most studies consider a defense in-depth methodology where all layers of defense
have a chance of countering the incoming missile attack. This equates to ASCM kill
probabilities of99% or higher [Ref. 8, Ref. 15]. These studies, however, assume that
enough time and space exist for an Aegis system, for example, to detect and engage with
all its systems. Naturally, the hits on ships depend on more variables than test range point
defense effectiveness.
In this thesis, a layered point defense is calculated as a parallel system. A CG-47
class ship has ESM/SRBOC, CIWS and ESS (each of these is explained later). The total





V ~ "ESS A ~ "eSMA ~" "ciWS )
PK Total =1-(1-.7)(1-.325)(1-.575)=.914
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Assuming that incoming missiles will be detected in time for only one SAM salvo
per missile by the defender, each ship will defend against leakers with its point defense
systems. In the case of the escorts, the defense in depth methodology is applied
(computing defense systems in parallel), but an effectiveness weight value is applied. The
weight value applied comes from the Schulte thesis [Ref 5], since his data showed that for
all the missiles shot at defended ships after 1982, there was a 45% chance of a hit. The
study discovered that all but one missile which did not hit the ships, were defeated by
passive defense systems. The 45% chance of being hit equates to a 55% effectiveness of
point defense systems (soft and hard kill). Many other variables such as scenario, surprise,
time of detection, environmental factors, and human factors affect the outcome of a
missile attack. These "fog of war" variables are inherent in the combat data reported by
Schulte. Consequently, our 55% effectiveness weight factor for the combined point
defense systems is considered realistic.
Applying the effectiveness weight value results in the ship's final adjusted point
defense (PD) PK, which does not overestimate self defense capabilities. The results for all
escorts are given in Table 7.
PKAdjusted = (PKTotai)(weight) = (.914)(.55) = .503
Ship Esm/SRBOC ESS CIWS Total PK Eff Weight Adjusted PK
CG-47 0.325 0.7 0.575 0.914 0.55 0.503
DDG-51 0.325 0.7 0.575 0.914 0.55 0.503
DDG-993 0.325 n/a 0.575 0.713 0.55 0.394
DD-963 0.325 n/a 0.575 0.713 0.55 0.394
FFG-7 0.325 n/a 0.575 0.713 0.55 0.394
Table 7: Point defense effectiveness values (PD Pks) for the escort ships.
9. Radar Cross Section (RCS)
This input represents the escorts' signature emissions (detailed in the definition of
stealth in Appendix B) that incoming missiles can target on. RCS is used as a
representation of stealth. Assuming that the ship design is balanced— that is to say no
detectable emission is grossly more discernible than another— the RCS approximation
method is sufficient for our analysis. As discussed in Chapter III, this input is the basis on
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which leakers are allocated amongst ships. The actual numbers are not crucial for the
model, but rather the ratios between platforms and arsenal ship are important.
Since a ship's RCS is classified, this thesis will use length, freeboard and mast
height to compute representative RCS values. Figure 8 shows how RCS is actually
calculated . Using this methodology, RCS is the sum of the superstructure area
Mast Height
Freeboard
Figure 8: Escort RCS
(1/2 x Length x Mast Height) and hull area (Length x Freeboard). RCS figures are given
in Table 8. Assumed arsenal ship dimensions are 700ft length, 15ft freeboard and 75ft
mast height. This suggests that our notional arsenal ship will ride low in the water. The
Arleigh Burke Class destroyers were designed with stealth features, so the RCS used is
assumed 1/2 that of a typical destroyer built without stealth.






567 20 136 49,896
505 25 148 24,998
563 20 143 51,515
453 15 116 33,069
700 15 75 36,750
ible 8: RCS inpu ts into model bzised on Length , Freeboard aind Bridge Heig
Additional RCS is incurred when topside systems are added to the base arsenal
ship. For each feature considered, there is an 'additional RCS' input. Our RCS values are
based on the equation below. Height values were obtained from the Naval Warfare
Publications (NWP-65 series).
Additional RCS = (LengtllArsenal X HeightFeature) x 0.5
B. SUSCEPTIBILITY FEATURES
Soft kill, hard kill, and defensive measures can be employed to reduce the
susceptibility of the arsenal ship. Soft kill features can confuse or 'draw off an incoming
missile before or after it has detected and targeted the ship. To defeat an incoming missile
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which has detected and targeted the arsenal ship, active defense features can be used.
Every system placed on the arsenal ship has associated pros and cons. The pro is its
effectiveness to soft kill or hard kill the incoming missile. The cons are the cost of the
system and the additional RCS (implying loss of stealth) it adds to the ship.
1. Soft Kill Systems
Passive defense systems are those that reduce detectability or prevent an incoming
missile from hitting the ship by means other than physical destruction. Reducing
detectability is the same as increasing the effectiveness of stealth. Soft kill is the
destruction or confusion of an incoming missiles' sensors or guidance system. This causes
the missile to be drawn off target or renders it ineffective to function as designed, thus
missing the ship. Electronic counter measures (ECM) and Electronic support measures
(ESM) with CHAFF function in this manner.
cl Stealth
Reducing RCS through 'bending' metal from the traditional 90 degree
right angles or use of radar absorbing materials; reducing IR through innovative ways of
cooling engine exhaust or ship surfaces; reducing visual through camouflage or decreasing
the amount of ship above the waterline; reducing acoustic through innovative designs in
mechanical systems and sound and vibration control; and reducing EME through
employing EMCON tactics are areas the user needs to consider employing on the arsenal
ship. Again, for stealth there are pros and cons to be input; effectiveness and cost. Stealth
is a survival multiplier. It is well known that reducing a ship's RCS will greatly increase
the effectiveness of chaff on an incoming missile. The same applies to IR reduction and
TORCH deployment. But the extent of the effectiveness in combat is not known.
The cost of stealthing a ship is relatively unknown. Starting without a base
ship design further complicates the problem. If stealth is to be considered as a whole, then
the user must aggregate the affects of each signature reduction and their cost. If each
system is considered separately, then an estimate of effectiveness and cost is required. In
the absence of detailed estimates and to simplify the complication, this thesis will consider
that stealthing a 20 thousand ton arsenal ship will have an affect of reducing our notional
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stealth signature, RCS, to 1/8 the original RCS for a 20 percent cost increase. Table 9
shows the values as they are input into the model. AAW PK is a multiplier that effectively
"destroys" (renders ineffective) seven out of eight ASCMs that would otherwise hit the
arsenal ship. The 'additional RCS' input is not a factor, since stealthing a ship does not
add more RCS signature to the ship.
Nomenclature MinQty Max Qty AAWPk Procurement Annual O&S UteCycle Annual Cost Additional RCS
Stealth 0| 1 0.875 $90,000,000 $0 35 1 $2,571,429
Table 9: Stealth values input into the model
b. ESM/CHAFF
ESM provides the ship a 'heads up' of an incoming missile. The system
then alerts the ship to the incoming and is able to automatically fire CHAFF/TORCH if it
is configured to do so. Evasive maneuvers and seducing missiles with CHAFF or TORCH
rounds are methods to draw off an incoming missile.
As discussed in the escort self defense section, this thesis uses 32.5% for
the ESM/CHAFF soft kill probability. This figure is considered an underestimation, since
Schulte's analysis ofASCM effectiveness in the littoral finds that "Softkill measures
employed against anti-ship missiles were extremely successful, seducing or decoying every
missile it was used against. In every engagement where a defender was alerted and
deployed softkill measures, every missile salvo was entirely defeated" [Ref 5, p. 35]. O&S
cost per year is $500K per year (FY95 dollars adjusted to FY96 using 3% inflation rate).
This cost is the average of all ESM systems (SLQ-32 VI - 4). Procurement data for a
SLQ-32 V2 and 6 MK36-6 rocket launchers is S4.34M. For additional RCS, we
estimated a height of 3 feet for this feature. The values input into the model are given in
Table 10.
Nomenclature Mm Qty Max Qty AAWPk Procurement Annual O&S UfeCycle Annual Cost Additional RCS
Esm/Srboc 1 0.325 $7,025,000 $500,000 $700,714 1050
Table 10: ESM/SRBOC model input values
2. Hard Kill Systems
Active defense systems are those that apply physical force to destroy or damage an
incoming missile to the extent that it does not hit the ship, or reduces the damage the
missile causes (i.e., causes the missile to explode before hitting the ship). These systems
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can acquire and attack the incoming missile at the 10-20nm range like the rolling airframe
missile (RAM) or evolved sea sparrow (ESS), or at shorter ranges like the CIWS (0-lnm).
The 5"54 gun loaded with an IR round also has a small ASCM capability. We did not
consider using the 5"54 gun option since it is assumed there will not be enough time to
acquire, target, load and fire the gun in a littoral engagement. New advanced systems like
Ram accelerator CIWS, improved SMs, etc. can be tested for their overall effects in
arsenal ship survivability and battleforce sustainability.
cl RAM
The RAM (RJM- 1 1 6) series surface-to-air missile is designed to provide
defense against cruise missiles. It is a box-type launcher on the outer deck of a ship and is
propelled by a modified Sidewinder missile rocket motor, guided by a Stinger missile
seeker and carries a Sidewinder warhead. It is a fire and forget missile. In this thesis 0.7
is used as the effectiveness against an incoming target [Ref. 15]. In this case only one
system will be considered. Since cost data is not available, it is estimated that the lifecycle
cost for RAM would be $10M amortized over 35 years. Annual O&S cost is assumed to
be similar to that of CIWS, $378,000. The total annual lifecycle cost is then $661,714.
For additional RCS we assume this feature has a total height of 15 feet. Table 1 1 shows
the RAM values used in the model.
Nomenclature MinQty MaxQty AAW Fk Procurement Annual O&S UfeCycle Annual Cost Additional RCS
RAM 07 $10,000,000 $376,000 35 1 $661,714 5250
Table 1 1 : RAM model input values.
b. ESS
The Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESS) is based upon the current ATM-7M Sea
Sparrow missile. It includes improvements in the rocket motor, aerodynamic control
system and auto-pilot while remaining a vertically launched missile. This feature allows
for the missiles to be stored in the arsenal ships VLS cells, thus reducing top side 'clutter'.
The MK 91 FCS has a dual "headlight" configuration of antennas, one for transmitting and
the other for receiving. ESS requires active guidance from the ship. This thesis will use
0.7 as the effectiveness against an incoming target. [Ref. 15]. Since cost data is not
available, an $8M is estimated for procurement. O&S costs are assumed similar to that of
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ESM/CHAFF, $376,000 per year. The total annual lifecycle cost is then $604,571. For
additional RCS, we assume this feature has a height of 10 feet. Table 12 shows the ESS
values used in the model.
Nomenclature Min Qty Max Qty AAWPk Procurement Annual O&S LifeCycle Annual Cost Additional RCS
ESS 1 0.7 $8,000,000 $376,000 35 $604,571 3500
Table 12: Evolved Sea Sparrow model input values
c. Vulcan Phalanx CIWS
The MK 1 5 Close-in Weapon system is a short range defensive system
effective against air targets between (0-lnm). If so equipped, the arsenal ship will contain
the required number ofCIWS systems to give the ship 360 degree coverage. Each CIWS
is a self contained system and is procured and supported as such. Whether there are one,
two, three or four mounts on the ship, will be reflected in the cost of the total system. In
the model, the quantity for CIWS should be '0' for no CIWS, or ' 1' for a set oftwo
mounts. The AAW PK for CIWS is 0.575 which is the average effectiveness against four
different types of missiles [Ref 15]. The O&S cost data for two mounts is $752,000 from
the Center for Naval Cost Analysis VAMOSC program office [Ref. 16]. Procurement
cost is $12,391,400 dollars for two mounts obtained from Data Search Associates [Ref.
12] The total annual lifecycle cost for two mounts is then $1,106,040. For additional
RCS, we assume this feature has a height of 10 feet for each mount. Table 13 shows the
CIWS values used in the model.
Nomenclature Min Qty Max Qty AAW Pk Procurement Annual O&S UfeCycle Annual Cost Additional RCS
CIWS 1 0.575 $12,391,400 $752,000 35 $1,106,040 | 7000
Table 13: CIWS model input values
C. VULNERABILITY
These are features that reduce vulnerability after a ship has been hit. All features
represented in this section will be taken in parallel to combat the incoming missiles.
Another way of saying this is that they "will decrease post-hit vulnerability." [Ref. 11].
The features listed in this area are considered to work in parallel to reduce the effects of a
hit. Features considered are component redundancy, component location, passive damage
suppression, active damage control, component shielding and component elimination. In




Magazine protection/mass detonation protection
Fully redundant combat systems
Double ended propulsion
Ship size
The effect of varying vulnerability features in cruisers and destroyers was explored
in a NSWC Carderock study. This study explores increasing survivability by decreasing
the ship's vulnerability The arsenal ship design could benefit from a study like this. The
Ship Vulnerability Model (SVM) "which provides probability for loss of ship functions
after hits by selected threat classes" could benefit the arsenal ship designers prior to the
ship being built. [Ref 7]
For each feature considered, an effectiveness value (AAW Pk), cost and additional
RCS input are required. Since the data in Ref. 7 is classified, the authors have chosen to
use an aggregate hardening input. Our hardening package is assumed to provide the
arsenal ship with a threefold increase in staying power. The cost is assumed to be 35% of
the base ship cost. It is assumed that hardening does not increase the ship's RCS
signature. See Table 14 for our model input for hardening.
Nomenclature MinQty Max Qty AAW Pk Procurement Annual O&S UfeCycle Annual Cost Additional RCS
Hardening 1 0.6667 $157,500,000 $0 35 $4,500,000
|
Table 14: Hardening model input values
D. SURPRISE ATTACK/NO SURPRISE ATTACK OPTION
If the surprise option is not toggled, then the task force is assumed to be aware of
every incoming hostile missile. Toggling surprise attack assumes that the first missile
attack will be a surprise and will penetrate the task forces defenses with a probability of 1
.
The second missile attack is also assumed to be a surprise, but only has a guaranteed
penetration of .5. All missile attacks which follow will be subject to a task force which is
now alert and defending against incoming missiles at full effectiveness. This option
originates from a littoral scenario where the battle space is small and the enemy launches
without any indications or warnings. This is a real problem. Our task forces can rarely
operate in a status of weapons free. The first indication of hostilities may be a surprise
missile launch.
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E. AGGREGATE INCREASED DETECTABELITY
If the increase in RCS attributed to each feature placed on the arsenal ship is
unknown or the crude approximations presented in this thesis are not considered
reasonable, then this option is recommended. Employing this model option assumes that
any hard kill or soft kill features placed on the arsenal ship will cut the stealth effectiveness
in half. Topside systems increase detectability by creating increased radar return, light,
heat and smoke. By how much is difficult to determine, and it is complicated when
stealthing is involved, but the effect is probably greater than the increase in RCS. Our
simple solution is to activate the "reduced RCS" feature when the arsenal ships defenses
are employed.
F. LIMITING THRESHOLDS
These inputs define desired survivability and cost. If both limiting criteria can be
met, thejr system produces feasible solutions. This thesis uses .8 as the survivability
criterion and 50 million dollars for the maximum annual system cost.
G. SUSTAINABILITY INPUTS
The inputs for the Sustainability model are identical to the Survivability model's
inputs, as shown below.
1. Arsenal Ship Design
The user chooses the arsenal ship's design by hardwiring the desired soft kill, hard
kill, and vulnerability features in the Excel spread sheet. The design can be a configuration
produced using the Survivability model, or another that the user designates. From our
runs of the Survivability program, we have decided to run varying designs of the arsenal
ship. The inputs for each run will be discussed in Chapter V.
2. Task Force Composition
The Task Force can contain any number of escorts. The user decides based on the




In the Sustainability model, the only limiting criterion is the arsenal ship's
survivability level. This value is the percentage of staying power above OOA which the
user desires the arsenal ship to retain. Once the staying power falls below this threshold,
the arsenal ship is considered OOA. Our requirement will be that the arsenal ship remain
above 80% of its staying power.
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V. SURVIVABILITY SUB-MODEL RESULTS
We do not intend to design the arsenal ship. Chapters V and VI show examples
of how the model can be used. We cannot explore all possible configurations as a typical
run may yield more than 62,000 possibilities. That is just for our data. Varying
parameters and introducing additional systems can increase the candidates manyfold.
We present examples that we believe are realistic or interesting and perform sensitivity
analysis on significant factors affecting results.
A. DESCRIPTION
Unless otherwise stated, the inputs shown in Table 15 are used in this chapter for
running the Survivability Sub-model.
Escort Ships
\
Ship Class Min Qty Max Qty SAM Pk Procurement Annual O&S UfeCycle Annual Cost it ASM SAMs
CG-47 2 0.7 $1,237,038,179 $28,814,948 30 $70,049,554 70
DDG-51 2 0.7 $1,063,900,596 $21 ,500.976 30 556,964329 50
DDG-993 1 0.5 $469,262,553 $25,156,840 30 $40,798,925 56
DD-963 $469,262,553 $44,250,516 30 $59,892,601
FFG-7 o 2 0.4 $298,513,074 $17,077,516 30 $27,027,952 21
Arsenal Ship n/a $450,000,000 35 $12,857,143 284
SetfDef Underway Displace RCS Mission Time
Ship Class Pk Days Tons Value Value (Motes Ann. Esc. Cost
CG-47 503 90 '9600 49896 085 $14,681,619
DDG-51 0.503 90 8300 24998 0.85 $11,939,099
DDG-993 0.394 90 9800 51515 0.85 $8,551,008
DD-963 394 90 8000 51515 0.85 312,552.833
FFG-7 0.394 90 3700 33069 0.85 $5,664,763
Arsenal Ship n/a n/a 20000 36750
I
Systems
Nomenclature Mln Qty Max Qty AAW Pk Procurement Annual O&S LifeCycle Annual Cost Additional RCS
Stealth i 1 0.875 $90,000,000 $0 35 $2,571,429
Esm/Srboc i 1 325 $7,025,000 $500,000 35 '5700,714 1050
CIWS 1 1 0.575 $12,391,400 $752,000 35 $1,106,040 7000
ESS 1 1 1 0.7 $8,000,000 $376,000 35 $604,571 3500
Active Defense Effectiveness 55 ir
Hardening 1 1 "b.eeeeeee? $157,500,000 $0 35 $4,500,000
j O Su'P'ise Attack Option
j ® No Surprise Attack




Incoming Missile Shots M 1 00
Missile Explosive Weight He 250
Minimum Survival Probability MINPROB 0.8
Annual Life Cycle Cost Cost $35,000,000
Table 15. Input Parameters for Survivability Example
OF EFFECTIVENESS APPLIEDB.
The survivability model results reflect the inputs above for a raid of 100 incoming
missiles and show three different possible measures of effectiveness (MOEs) one may
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employ to determine the best configuration candidates. Direction from higher authorities
and the user's preferences will dictate which is best for the situation.
• MOE #1
:
(Best Cost/Effectiveness ratio) This MOE sorts the output by the
Cost/Effectiveness, subject to meeting both cost and survival thresholds—
lowest is best.
• MOE #2: (Minimum Cost Subject to Survivability Constraint) This MOE
sorts the output in ascending cost order.
• MOE #3 : (Maximum Survivability Subject to Cost Constraint) This MOE
sorts the output in descending order of survivability.
The output for each MOE is presented graphically in composite charts which show
the configuration components in different colors on a bar graph. A line indicating
survivability level is superimposed and read from the scale in the right margin. The graphs
display the top six configurations for each MOE, first under the input conditions stated








9 1 - Cost Effectiveness Yes
10 1 - Cost Effectiveness No
11 2 - Minimum Cost Yes
12 2- Minimum Cost No
13 3 - Maximum Survivability Yes
14 3 - Maximum Survivability No
Table 16. Index for Survivability
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Figure 10. MOE #1 : Best Cost/Effectiveness Configurations (Surprise Attack)
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MOE #2: Minimum Cost Configurations (No Surprise)





































































































































Figure 14. MOE #3: Maximum Survivability Configurations (Surprise Attack)
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C. INTERPRETATION OF BEST CONFIGURATION RESULTS
1. No Surprise Attacks
Of the top six configurations for MOE #1, all six included one or more hard kill
systems. Four used stealth, and four incorporated hardening. Three included soft kill, and
the bottom three employed escorts. For MOE #2, the overall breakdown of desirability
of features was nearly the same. In fact, four of the top six configurations are the same
for MOE #1 and MOE #2. The order of preference differs, however. Stealth was added
in five vice four configurations.
MOE #3 produced drastically different results. All of the top six configurations
incorporated escorts and hard kill systems. Soft kill and stealth each appeared in five
configurations, and hardening was present in four. Each of the top configurations from
MOE #3 cost two to four times the configurations produced in the other MOEs.
2. Surprise Attacks
Recall the assumption that in a surprise attack the first missile will strike a ship and
the second will have a fifty percent chance of leaking through defenses and hitting a ship.
The impact is a reduction in overall arsenal ship survivability of 2.5 to 5 percentage points.
The decline is greatest in configurations with escorting warships
The astute reader, trying to ascertain patterns may notice an apparent paradox in
the interrelationships of adding escorts and changing surprise options. When surprise is
not present, adding escorts to a fixed configuration will increase survivability. For a
surprise scenario, however, the results seem inconsistent. In some instances adding
escorts improves survivability and others not. The illustration below (Figure 1 5) uses data
extracted from Figures 9,10,13 and 14 to demonstrate the issue.
The result is counterintuitive at first. The reason is complex. In Case 1 of the
illustration (Figure 15), when a surprise raid is launched on the arsenal ship escorted with
an FFG-7, the arsenal ship fares worse than if it operated alone. This is because even
though it incorporates stealth, the arsenal ship is more visible when operating with another
ship. Making matters worse, there is only one other ship to share the damage inflicted by
leakers, and a frigate is relatively small. If the frigate were larger, it would have more
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have more staying power and attract a larger share of the leakers. The defense afforded
by the frigate is not sufficient to overcome these detractors to arsenal ship survivability.
In contrast, the CG-47 and DDG-993 (in case 2 of Figure 15) have sufficient staying
power and defensive capability to boost the arsenal ship's survivability even though the





No Surprise 0.899 0.901
Surprise 0.872 ("""" 0.863"
Case 2: Survivability
Base 2 Base 2 +
No Surprise 0.932 0.979
Surprise 0.904f 0.942-
Base 1: stealth, CIWS, ESS, hardening
Base 1 +: Base 1 and 1 FFG-7
Base 2: stealth, CIWS, ESS, hardening, ESM
Base 2 +: Base 2, 1 CG-47, and 1 DDG-993
Figure 15. Arsenal Ship Survivability Paradox Illustration
3. Generalizations
While each MOE is quite different in emphasis, some configuration
recommendations apply universally. Hard kill systems appear in the top six
configurations of each MOE regardless of surprise attack. When surprise attack applies,
all top configurations incorporate stealth and hardening also.
D. SENSITIVITY
1. Stealth
Since stealth appears in most favorable output configurations, a closer look at the
effects of stealth on survivability is in order. Figure 16 shows the effects of stealth for
incoming missile raids of size 50, 100, and 150. The configuration includes stealth,
ESM, ESS, CIWS, and hardening. The stealth factor ranges from 1 to 12 corresponding
with no reduction up to a V 12 reduction in signature. Interestingly, the effects nearly
level-off after a reduction factor of about four for the cases studied. This indicates that
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while stealth is important, investing past this point provides diminishing marginal
returns and may not be the wisest investment.




10 1 1 1?
Stealth Factor (Signature Reduction)
Figure 16. Sensitivity of Survivability to the Degree of Stealth
2. Hardening
Hardening also appears in the best configurations. To test the sensitivity
of survivability to hardening, the degree of hardening is varied for a ship with stealth,
ESM, ESS, CIWS, and hardening. The hardness factor was varied from one to six and
one-half; this corresponds with no improvement of staying power over the base ship up to
a six and one-half-fold improvement. The results appear in Figure 17. Again one sees a
"knee" in the curve (in the neighborhood of a hardening factor of 3), thus indicating that
investments in hardening are good to a point. After that, investments in other systems
most-likely will affect survivability more.








Table 17 summarizes the effects on the arsenal ship's survivability of adding one
or two escorts of a particular class to the task force. Three configurations of arsenal
ships are examined. The base case incorporates no defensive systems or design features;
the next case includes only the ship design features of stealth and hardening, and the final
case combines stealth, hardening, CIWS, ESS, and ESM. The survivability (SA ) values
are generated from the model, and the values in parenthesis are the absolute increase in
survivability over the unescorted case for each configuration. Figures 1 8 and 19 plot the































































Table 17. Effects of Adding Escorts on Arsenal Ship Survivability (SA )
An arsenal ship without any defensive systems is not survivable with less than
two Aegis ships. A ship configured with only modest self-defense features benefits
greatly from additional escorts. Both the systems on the escort and the fact that the
escorts have larger signatures to draw missiles work to bolster arsenal ship survivability.
An arsenal ship configured with formidable self-defense systems will naturally achieve
the highest level of survivability when escorted over any other configuration. The







































Sustainability is measured by the naval component's time on station. It needs to be
emphasized that sustainability involves more than a BG's ability to conduct strikes and
take hits. These are the indicators of sustainability. A naval component's sustainability
results from both onboard ship design and external logistics support (fuel, ordnance,
material, food, etc.). In this analysis we will review the impact of an arsenal ship's design
and ordnance load on the BG's sustainability. Three areas of sustainability are examined.
• The effect of varying arsenal ship survivability on the naval component's
sustainability
• BG sustainability with an arsenal ship vs. with five Arleigh Burkes
• VLS replenishment issues
B. ARSENAL SHIP SURVIVABILITY VS. NAVAL COMPONENT
SUSTAINABILITY
The term "naval component" is emphasized because we are not measuring just the
sustainability of the arsenal ship. Our approach assumes the naval component's
sustainability is equivalent to the escorts' sustainability. We base this on the premise that a
BG can remain on station without an arsenal ship, but an arsenal ship cannot remain on
station without an escort present, since there are also surface and sub-surface threats
which the arsenal ship requires escorts to protect against.
Our approach is to vary the arsenal ship's survivability and examine the impact on
the BG's sustainability. Our baseline BG has 1 Ticonderoga Class Cruiser, 2 Arleigh
Burke Class destroyers, 1 Kidd Class destroyer and 2 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates.
This is considered the base case. Table 18 lists each modification to the base that we
examine. System 1 is the base and systems 2 through 15 add an arsenal ship with varying
degrees of defensive features. Running each system through the Sustainability model with











BG = 1 CG-47, 2 DDG-51
4 BG, HK 1 DDG-993, 2 FFG-7
5 BG, Hard
6 BG, ST, SK ST = Stealth
7 BG, ST, HK
8 BG, ST, Hard SK = Soft Kill = ESM/SRBOC
9 BG, SK, Hard
10 BG, HK, Hard HK = Hard Kill = CIWS, ESS
11 BG, SK, HK
12 BG, SK, HK, Hard
13
14
BG, ST, SK, Hard
BG, ST, HK, Hard
Hard = Hardening
15 BG, ST, SK, HK Hard
Table 1 8 : Sustainability Model Run Battle Group Composition







Cost EffectSystem Escorts OOA AS OOA
1 108 111 $0 $58,440,350
2 176 182 150 $2,571,428 $61,011,778 14610
3 120 109 188 $700,714 $59,141,064 5839
4 210 216 94 $1,710,611 $60,150,961 8146
5 192 187 94 $4,500,000 $62,940,350 23438
6 176 186 150 $3,272,143 $61,712,493 18592
7 180 239 142 $4,282,040 $62,722,390 23789
8 176 199 150 $7,071,428 $65,511,778 40179
9 210 211 94 $5,200,714 $63,641,064 24765
10 210 232 94 $6,210,611 $64,650,961 29574
11 210 220 94 $2,411,325 $60,851,675 11483
12 210 244 94 $6,911,325 $65,351,675 32911
13 180 271 142 $4,982,754 $63,423,104 27682
14 180 371 142 $8,782,040 $67,222,390 48789
15 180 466 142 $9,482,754 $67,923,104 52682
Table 19: Model Results for the Systems identified in Table 1, an arsenal ship limiting
survivability of .8, no surprise option and aggregate RCS feature
Table 19 contains the following data. 'Missiles Escorts OOA' is the number of
incoming missiles it took to put the escorts OOA. 'Missiles AS OOA' is the number of
incoming missiles it took to put the arsenal ship OOA with .8 probability. 'Missiles left on
Arsenal' is the number of SAMs remaining on the arsenal ship when it was rendered OOA.
'Annual cost of Arsenal' is the annual system cost above the base arsenal ship cost (for
which we assumed $450 million). 'Annual cost with Escorts' is the annual system cost
52
plus the annual cost of the escorts. The 'Cost Effect' column is the annual cost of the
arsenal ship divided by the number of missiles it took to put the arsenal ship 00A.
1. Measures of Effectiveness
The number of incoming missiles required to put the escorts OOA is the measure
of effectiveness. The number of incoming missiles equates to 'time on station' if the
incoming rate (missiles per unit time) is known. The naval component's data in Table 19
indicates systems 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12 have the greatest sustainability levels. Artificially
discrete sustainability levels are introduced as a result of using the "aggregate RCS"
degradation factor (refer to Chapter 4.E). The hard kill feature occurred most frequently,
being in four of the five systems. Hardening and soft kill features occurred in three of the
five systems each.
Stealth is not a feature in any of the five systems with the greatest sustainability.
This is an artifact of allocating leakers based on a fair share of the BG's total RCS. The
stealthier the arsenal ship, the lower its 'fair share' of leakers, which causes the escorts to
be attrited faster, thereby reducing the naval component's overall sustainability. At this
point we need to define the term balanced force . A balanced force is a BG whose ships'
signature levels are roughly equivalent. It is not practical to expect all ships to have the
same signature levels; however as the variance approaches zero, the missiles are allocated
more uniformly (allocation per ship = 1/number of ships). With this in mind, as the Navy
builds the SC-21 and future ships with lower signatures, the BG's overall signature will
decline. Since a balanced force will have the greatest overall sustainability, stealthing the
arsenal ship will be essential.
To discern which of these five candidates (4, 9, 10, 1 1, or 12) is the best, requires
further evaluation of the BG's performance under additional criteria.
a. Choice by Arsenal Ship Sustainability
Ifwe choose which of the five systems is best based on greatest arsenal
ship sustainability, then systems 10 and 12 are best. In the case of system 12, another way
of stating it is that the arsenal ship survives until missile 244, and so system 12 had more
staying power remaining when the escorts in the other configurations were put OOA.
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Though stealth is not incorporated in any ofthe systems of choice, the effect of
stealth requires explanation in order to interpret the other system results in Table 19.
After the escorts are put OOA, two methods are used to attrite an arsenal ship without
escorts. When stealth is not a feature, every missile targets the arsenal ship and is subject
to its point defense systems. If the arsenal ship is stealthed, the incoming missiles are
reduced by the inverse of the stealth factor (1/Stealth Factor) initially. For example, a
stealth factor of eight prevents seven out of eight shots from acquiring the arsenal ship.
This is why systems 13, 14, and 15 require such a large number missiles to put the arsenal
ship OOA.
b. Choice by Ordnance Available
Another way to determine which of systems 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12 is the best
can be based on the number of arsenal ship SAMs used. Vice Admiral (Ret.) Joseph
Metcalf, one of the Surface Warfare Community's former leaders, espoused that the
primary mission of a surface combatant is to deliver "maximum ordnance on target." [Ref
17, p. 36] He referred to strike ordnance, not defensive ordnance like SAMs. The more
strike weapons the BG has, the greater its offensive potential, provided it can survive. In
Table 1 9, all five systems have 94 SAMs remaining after the escorts are put OOA. As a
reminder, our arsenal ship has a load out of 228 strike weapons and 284 SAMs (refer to
Chapter 4.B.3 for details). Since no escorts remain to control the 94 remaining SAMs,
their potential is never realized. Assume, for a moment, that all 228 strike weapons were
fired from the arsenal ship and 94 SAMs remained in their cells when it had to leave
station. For each of the five systems with 94 remaining SAMs, the load out could be
modified to be filled with strike ordnance. This would give the arsenal ship the striking
potential of 228 + 94 = 322 strike weapons vice 228. Since "ordnance on target" is the
goal, all five systems chosen perform equally well.
c. Choice by Cost
Assuming for a moment that the cost of defending the arsenal ship with a
BG is a sunk cost, then screening our five chosen systems by the Cost data in Table 19,
indicates that systems 4 and 1 1 with annual lifecycle costs of $1.7 and $2.4 million, are
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best. System 4 incorporates hard kill features and system 1 1 incorporates hard and soft
kill features. Systems 9, 10 and 12 contain hardening which increases their annual cost
two to three times higher.
d. Choice by Cost Effectiveness
Another measure is cost effectiveness, which represent the cost for each
unit of sustainability. The cost effectiveness column (far right) in Table 19 is calculated by
taking the annual life cycle cost without escorts divided by the number of missiles to put
the escorts OOA. Since a lower cost effectiveness is desired, systems 4 and 1 1 are the
best with $8,146 and $1 1,483 per incoming missile respectively. Again, system 4 contains
hard kill systems only, and system 1 1 contains hard and soft kill systems. These systems
yield the best "bang for the buck."
2. Interpretation of Best Configuration Results
At this point in the analysis, caution must be taken. The means by which the best
of the five is chosen is subjective. If concerned with budget, opt for the lowest cost.
Another approach is to choose best "bang for the buck." Looking at individual measures
separately can lead to a misinterpretation of the overall analysis. All MOEs need to be
examined simultaneously, but each MOE is not necessarily equal in weight, and any
weighting scheme we set can easily be countered by another. So, our stand is to
rationalize the needs of the warfighter, the CINC. In order to fight and win, a BG must
remain on station and overcome the enemy. This implies fighting hurt and delivering
ordnance. Of the best systems (4, 9, 10, 11 and 12), systems 10 and 12 provide the BG,
as a whole, with the most sustainability, and yield a potential 228 + 94 = 322 cells for
missions other than BG defense. From the warfighter' s perspective, first and foremost,
sustainability is staying power, and systems 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are equal. When
considering ordnance, all five systems are equal. However, when looking at the BG's
sustainability as a whole (not just at the escorts) we see that system 10 affords the most
overall sustainability. It is ranked 10 out of 15 for its cost and cost effectiveness,
however.
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C. SUSTAINABBLITY WITH ARSENAL SHIP VS. FIVE ARLEIGH BURKES
In order to deploy the same capacity as the arsenal ship's 512 VLS cells in theater,
the Navy would need to deploy 5.7 (or 5 by rounding down to keep costs conservative)
Arleigh Burkes. Running the sustainability sub-model for a BG with an arsenal ship and
for a BG with five additional Arleigh Burkes, produces the results in Table 20. We chose
the arsenal ship configuration which produced the most sustainable BG in Part B of this
chapter (system 12). The arsenal ship has soft kill, hard kill, and hardening features, but
no stealth. The cost data for one arsenal ship and five Burkes is shown in Table 21.
Category Arsenal Ship 5 Arleigh Burkes
BG Sustainabiltiy (incoming missiles) 210 233
Potential Strike VLS Celts 228 + 94 = 322 5(40) = 200
Table 20: Sustainability Sub-Model Results for an Arsenal Ship BG and an Arleigh Burke
BG. The arsenal ship's minimum survivability criteria is .8; the base BG has 1 CG-47, 2
DDG-5 1 , 1 DDG-993 and 2 FFG-7; and a no surprise scenario was chosen.
The BG survivability levels in Table 20 indicate that the Burke BG can stay on
station 10 percent longer than the arsenal ship BG. The runs indicate that the escorts in
the arsenal ship BG realize their full potential, by defending the BG until placed OOA. In
the Burke BG the escorts become combat ineffective by depleting their SAMs. This
means their full staying power is never realized.
The runs indicate that the arsenal ship has 94 SAMs remaining when placed OOA.
By replacing these with strike weapons in the load-out, the arsenal ship has a potential
strike capacity of 322, while still maintaining the BG's sustainability at 210 missiles. Refer
to Table 20. Conversely, the Burkes deplete all their SAMs indicating they could increase
the BG's sustainability if more SAMs were available. Reallocating any of the SAM VLS
cells on the Burkes would decrease the sustainability of the BG.
The cost values in the "5 Arleigh Burkes" column of Table 4 are derived using the
Burke's procurement cost and O&S costs over 35 years. The arsenal ship's costs are
unknown, so the following approach was taken for each area category of Table 21.
Procurement cost is assumed $450 million (refer to Chapter 2.C.). Added systems cost is
the sum of procurement and O&S costs times 35 years for all arsenal ship features.
Personnel cost was derived by prorating the personnel cost of an Arleigh Burke by the
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crew size of an arsenal ship (assumed 50) multiplied by 35 years. Material cost for an
arsenal ship is assumed to be equal to that of a single Arleigh Burke for 35 years. The


























Table 21 : Cost Comparison of an Arsenal Ship vs. Five Arleigh Burke ships in a BG
A quick comparison on the cost data in Table 21 shows that five Burkes cost 1 1.8
times more than an arsenal ship. The Burkes cost 9.4 times more per missile than the
arsenal ship.
D. VLS REPLENISHMENT ISSUES
An arsenal ship with 512 cells is a mixed blessing. It will provide a task force with
512 more missiles in theater, thus increasing sustainability of forces on station. However,
VLS replenishment at sea is still a problem, and pier side replenishment time is substantial.
To put this in perspective, 5 1 2 cells with a reload rate of 5 minutes per cell (highly
optimistic) would take approximately 43 continuous hours to reload. As it stands now, an
Aegis ship takes 2-3 days to reload about 100 VLS cells, so it would take 10-15 days to
reload an arsenal ship with 512 VLS cells. Replenishment is the Achilles' heel in VLS
operations. An article published in the Fall 1988 UNREP Journal stated:
"In wartime the enemy decides when and where we expend defensive
ammo, so an ammo UNREP may be needed any time, even when the seas
are rough or the decks are icy. While we may be able to rearm our aircraft
carriers under these conditions, our ability to handle missiles in dollies or in
VLS canisters on cruisers, destroyers, and frigates is currently extremely
poor." [Ref. 18]
Our ability to UNREP VLS missiles at sea has not improved much since the article
was written. The following example illustrates the potential dilemma. Our base BG
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without an arsenal ship encounters 25 incoming missiles, at which time the first Burke
requires replenishment. If operating in the Sea of Japan it would take approximately 29
hours at 28 knots to reach Sasebo, 6 hours to reload 65 cells (assuming reload rate of 5
minutes per missile and a demand of 50 SAMs and 15 strike weapons), and another 29
hours to get back on station. This equates to 2.8 days off-station. For a multi-mission
platform like the DDG-51 or CG-47, this is magnified.
It is frequently predicted that future warfare will be intense in the early days of an
MRC, with the tempo leveling off after around the 10th day of conflict [Ref. 10]. If this is
the case, even three days off station for our multi-mission platforms will severely reduce
the sustainability of the naval component in theater. The arsenal ship provides a strong
but temporary fix to the VLS replenishment problem that results from a limited number of
missiles on the DDG-5 1 and CG-47. The arsenal ships will surely fill the gap needed for
the surge in requirements at the start of a conflict. Once its missiles are expended,
however, the arsenal ship will be away for a long time. It is optimistic to assume the ship
can transit at 20 knots a great distance (escorted, of course), reload and return in 15-20
days, that forward logistics bases will be capable of reloading VLS quickly, and that the
ordnance will be available. At today's production rate (100-120 Tomahawks per year) it
could easily take two or more years worth of production to refill one arsenal ship. With
so many VLS cells on the cruisers, destroyers and six arsenal ships we're looking at most




The development of an arsenal ship represents fundamental change in naval and
joint warfare. Such a vessel will operate in the littoral and be able to provide strikes
ashore and theater ballistic missile defense. Additionally, weapons not previously placed
on naval ships can occupy VLS cells and provide new forms of direct support for ground
troops. The added capabilities, however, come at the cost of exposing the ship to sudden
and potentially numerous, technologically advanced, sea and land-based missile attacks.
Our Arsenal Ship Tradeoff Analysis Model consists of a survivability and a
sustainability sub-model. The survivability sub-model is a tool that may aid in the design
of the ship by predicting how the ship will survive against a specified threat depending on
the hard kill, soft kill, stealth, and hardening features built-in and the sevices provided by
escorting surface combatants (SCs). The sustainability model considers weapon logistics
and may prove useful in determining what portion of the arsenal ship's VLS cells may be
devoted to offensive weapons.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Based on exercising the Tradeoff Analysis Model with reasonable weapon system
effectiveness values, cost estimates, and three different measures of effectiveness, we
advocate an arsenal ship design that balances offense and survivability, the likes ofwhich
have not been seen in U.S. warship design since World War II.
Justification of this conclusion is involved. The analytical basis is explained in
detail on pages 42 to 48 of Chapter 5. The rationale can be summarized as follows:
• We premise that combatants operating in littoral waters will be subject to
increasingly dense and sophisticated missile attacks. Among them, surprise
attacks will occur.
• To carry out the multiple missions envisioned for it, the arsenal ship will be
exposed to such attacks. It can be escorted intermittently and only when
required, thereby saving the cost of built-in survivability. What fraction of the
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cost of the escorting surface combatant to charge against the arsenal ship is
crucial and depends on the proportionate time taken from other surface
combatant tasks. The dollar value is nearly impossible to determine analytically.
The multi-mission combatant escort cannot be regarded a free good (on the
basis that no added SCs are purchased as arsenal ship escorts) because the SC
may be lost in protecting the arsenal ship, in which case it is gone from every
other mission, too.
Fortunately, for a wide range of circumstances and measures of effectiveness,
the analysis shows that building survivability into the arsenal ship is almost
always preferred to assigning escorts, even when only a small fraction (18.6%)
of the SCs life cycle cost is charged against the escort role.
The preference for and selection of a survivability feature is less easily
described. The incorporation of stealth characteristics is, by the analysis, the
feature appearing in preferred designs most often. This may be a consequence
of the numbers chosen. The reader is cautioned to examine the numbers in
detail but is also warned that alternative numbers will be difficult to find. In
particular, the reader's attention is invited to Figure 16, page 48, which strongly
supports a moderate investment in stealth.
We have gone to some pains to show that stealth, ship hardening, and
defensive short range, hard and soft kill systems are complementary. For
example, stealth adds nothing when the arsenal ship is firing a large missile
volley, radiating, subject to air attack with bombs, surface gunfire attack, or a
submarine launched torpedo attack. But, hardening retains its effectiveness in
all these circumstances.
Our overall conclusion is that stealth, ship hardening, and some set of modern
point defense (hard and soft) are, in view of their modest cost in construction
and operating personnel, well worth the modest cost on the margin because the
arsenal ship's concept of operation requires that it be exposed to major attack.
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• Further, until the arsenal ship has expended its massive offensive punch, there
will be circumstances in which it should be escorted. It will probably draw the
attacks by the enemy to itself in the way CVs do.
• The arsenal ship alleviates the requirement to frequently cycle SCs with fewer
VLS cells from the scene of action off station to a replenishment site and back
again into the action. By its presence, the arsenal ship will sustain other SCs on
station. It can remain on station longer than any other ship for a given missile
delivery rate, but when its weapons are expended the reload problem will take it
off station for a considerable amount of time.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Our recommendation for arsenal ship survivability features is to incorporate
stealth, point self-defense systems, and hardening into the design.
Even though hard kill systems were more commonly seen in the analytically
preferred results than soft kill systems, we believe soft kill systems are essential for littoral
operations. First, soft kill is synergistic with stealth and softkill effectiveness is amplified.
Second, as noted, the Schulte thesis concluded that soft kill measures have been highly
effective in actual combat, but hard kill systems remain largely unproven [Ref. 5].
Operating in littoral waters with current rules of engagement (weapons not free) makes
the arsenal ship vulnerable to initial and sudden attacks without ample time to respond
with hard kill.
Our model shows that when surprise attacks occur, hardening is a very attractive
feature of ship design. The additional staying power to remain mission capable after at
least one hit will help ensure that the arsenal ship's 500-plus missiles are not rendered
useless by a lucky or cheap shot.
A balanced design will seek to maximize the arsenal ship's net delivered firepower
over the combat life of the ship. Incorporating allfeatures listed is, according to the
analysis, tantamount to over-designing arsenal ship survival features, when its survival
with thosefeatures is compared to the survival of the accompanying present-day surface
combatants. Since the DDG-5 1 and CG-47 cost roughly the same to procure as an arsenal
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ship-plus-missile load-out, and they will be less survivable, this may appear out of balance.
However, in the future as more Arleigh Burke destroyers and SC-2 1 type warships enter
the fleet, matching stealth and superior hardness will provide operational balance.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Our thesis concentrated on the ASCM threat to the arsenal ship. While this is
most likely the predominant danger, other nemeses such as submarine and mine threats
should be explored. Currently ships are not designed to withstand under hull blasts from
mines or torpedoes. Hardening ships displacing 10,000 tons or less against these threats
is not feasible, but if the arsenal ship is in the range of 20,000 tons, then a tradeoff analysis
is possible between the choices ofASW screening, active countermeasures, and hull
hardening. [Ref 7]
We studied the sustainability of the naval component only. Since the arsenal ship
is a joint war fighting platform that through CEC can be utilized by ground troops as well,
a theater level study of the marginal value of the arsenal ship's contribution to the ground
war is in order, with emphasis on the critical events at the war's onset. With over 500
VLS cells, the ship will surely contribute to checking the enemy onslaught by threatening a
massed surge or pulse of power delivered in a short time. The service performed will
encompass not only destroying hardware but promoting caution and slowing down the
enemy's operations as he exercises deception, concealment, and prudent behavior in
general.
Currently the Navy's capability to conduct underway replenishment ofVLS cells is
inconsequential. VLS cells are here to stay, with a growing variety of weapons. Faster
replenishment methods, be they at sea or ashore, beg for technological development.
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APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
A/C - aircraft
ARG - amphibious readiness group
ASCM - anti-ship cruise missile
ASW - anti-submarine warfare




C4I - command, control,
communications, computers, and
information
CEC - cooperative engagement
capability
CG - cruiser
CIWS - close-in weapon system
CINC - Commander-in-Chief
CMD - command
CNO - Chief ofNaval Operations
CVBG - carrier battle group
DARPA - Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency
DD - destroyer
DDG - guided missile destroyer
ECM - electronic countermeasures
EME - electromagnetic emissions
EMCOM - emissions control
ESM - electronic surveillance measures
ESS - evolved sea sparrow
EW - electronic warfare
FCS - fire control system
FFG - guided missile frigate
FY - fiscal year
IR - infrared
MRC - major regional contingency
NSWC - Naval Surface Warfare Center
O&S - operations and support
OOA - out of action
OMG - operational maneuver group
OP - operation
OTH - over the horizon
PD - point defense
PK - probability of kill
PR - program review
PSSK - single salvo kill probability
RAM - rolling airframe missile
RCS - radar cross-section
RDT&E - research, development,
testing, and evaluation
SAM - surface to air missile
SC - surface combatant
SLAM - stand-off land attack missile
SRBOC - super rocket blooming chaff
TBM - theater ballistic missile
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TBMD- theater ballistic missile defense
TLAM - Tomahawk land attack missile
TSSE - Total Ship System Engineering
UAV - unmanned aerial vehicle
VAMOSC - visibility and management of operational and support costs
VGAS - vertical gun advanced system










the model output which includes the collection of systems added to the
base arsenal ship and the warship escorts required to protect the arsenal
ship
an anti-ship cruise missile that is engaged but not defeated by defensive
measures [Ref. 8]
the reduction and control of observable signatures that are exploitable by
the enemy including electromagnetic emissions, radar cross section, visual
(wake), infrared, acoustic, and magnetic signatures [Ref. 9]
the number of hits that a ship can absorb before being rendered not mission
capable [Ref 8]
the inability of a ship to avoid the sensors, weapons, and weapons effects
of a man-made hostile environment [Ref. 1 1 ]
the capability of a surface ship to avoid and/or withstand a man-made
hostile environment while performing its mission [Ref 1 1 ]
the conditional probability of being killed given that a ship is hit [Ref. 1 1]
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APPENDIX C. USER'S GUIDE
Arsenal Ship Tradeoff Analysis Program
User's Guide
LT Ronald Bush LT Arthur Cimiluca
Note: This program requires Microsoft's Excel spreadsheet program for Windows.
1. Installation
A. Create a directory on hard drive: C:/ arsenal.







Note: additional text files will be created in the C:/ arsenal directory when the program runs.
2. Running to solve for configurations
A. Open the file arsenal.xls.
B. Examine the first sheet (labeled Arsenal). Sample data, which represents the best
unclassified information the authors could locate at the time of writing, is provided in all cells.
C. Update cost, kill probability, radar cross section, or ordnance load data if required.
D. Set the minimum and maximum ranges for each type of escort ship and candidate
system. If a system or escort is not listed, add it in the appropriate section by typing the name
over an n/a cell and entering the required characteristic data.
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E. Select No Surprise Attack or Surprise attack Option.
F. Select Degrade Stealth by 1/2... unless detailed radar cross section data is available
for all ships and systems examined.
G. Enter threat data for Days, Attacks/Day, and Missile/Attack.
H. Change missile explosive weight if considering other than Exocet equivalents.
I. Enter the Minimum Survival Probability threshold of interest.
J. Enter Annual Life Cycle Cost limit.
K. Click on Step # 1 button for the Survivability Sub-Model (Update).
- Answer yes to the "Replace existing 'FIGURES.TXT'?" prompt.
- Answer yes to the "Replace existing 'ARSENAL.XLS'?" prompt.
L. Highlight and double click on Step # 2 button (Enumerate).
M. Highlight and double click on Step # 3 (Run Pgm) button.
- Note the number of configurations that meet your criteria and close the text box.
N. Click on Step # 4 (Display) button.
- The All Data sheet will be displayed. It lists all the configurations that meet your
input requirements. Normal spreadsheet functions, such as sorting, can be performed to organize
the output data as desired.
- Also shown is a graph of survivability verses cost. This graph is useful in
identifying interesting configurations that warrant closer examination. The graph's properties may
require modification if the entire range of the budget is not displayed or if all points are not
displayed over the entire x-axis range. To adjust the graph, first double click on it.
(1) Then to modify the number of data points, double click on the plotted curve.
Select Names and Values, and observe the Y-Values line. The last number after the "$"
represents the number of data points; overwrite it with the number of configurations that met your
criteria (from step 2.M). Then select the X- Values tab, overwrite the last number after the "$"
on the X-Values line as above, and click on the OK button to exit Format Data Series.
(2) To change the cost scale, double click on the cost values and change the




Up to six configurations can be displayed in a graphical representation of cost,
survivability, and individual systems and ships in the All Data sheet. There are two options for
displaying results.
- Option 1 : The user may sort the data using the spreadsheet function in Excel and display
the top six results by pressing the 'Display first 6 results' button.
- Option 2: The user may determine which configurations to display from either the graph
or the spreadsheet data. Select a configuration by highlighting its entire row and copying it into
the Details sheet. Copy the first configuration into line 3 of the Details sheet and subsequent
configurations into lines 10,17,24,3 1, and 38. Scroll down the Details sheet to see the composite
graph.
This graph may be tailored to the user's needs. Adjustments to the cost scale (left) or
survivability scale (right) can be made by double clicking on the desired axis or axes and changing
the scale as in step 2.N.(2) above.
4. Printing Graphs
The options are numerous; three ways are described below.
A. Select Print, then Print Selected Sheet.
B. Activate a graph by double clicking on it. Select Print, then Print Selected Chart.
This method prints the graph on an entire sheet of paper and affords the user some formatting
options.
C. Highlight a graph by clicking on it. Then copy it to the windows clipboard and paste it
into a compatible program which can be printed.
Note: Perhaps the best way to import a graph to another program is by using the Paste Special
under the Edit menu and selecting Paste as Picture.
5. Running to solve for Sustainability
The same procedures apply as for "Running to solve for configuration." The step number
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and difference are given below.
2D. Hardwire the desired escorts and candidate systems by setting Min Qty and Max
Qty the same.
2.G. Not required. Sustainability program will solve for number of missiles.
2.1. Note: Min Survivability threshold is for the Arsenal Ship, not for the escorts. Each
escort will fight until 00A, while the Arsenal Ship will fight until it falls below the threshold.
2.N. There is no Step #4 button
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